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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-1158 
 
J. STEPHEN WOODSIDE; REBECCA R. WOODSIDE, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND AS 
PARENTS AND NEXT FRIEND OF ROBERT HENR Y 
WOODSIDE, A MINOR, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA BOARD 
OF EDUCATION 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(Dist. Court No. 99-CV-01830) 
District Court Judge: Raymond J. Broderick 
 
Argued on March 7, 2001 
 
Before: ALITO, MCKEE and KRAVITCH,* 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 23, 2001) 
 
       J. STEPHEN WOODSIDE (Argued) 
       123 South Broad Street, Suite 1812 
       Philadelphia, PA 19109 
 
       Counsel for Appellants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* The Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, Senior Judge, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
 
  
       GLENNA M. HAZELTINE (Argued) 
       School District of Philadelphia 
       Office of General Counsel 
       2130 Arch Street, 5th Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
       Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. 
 
This case presents an issue of first impr ession in this 
Circuit: whether a parent who is an attor ney can receive 
attorney fees for representing his minor child in 
administrative proceedings under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. S 1400 et. seq. 
("IDEA"). 
 
II. 
 
The plaintiff, J. Stephen Woodside ("Woodside"), is a 
licensed Pennsylvania attorney. Woodside's son, Robert 
Henry Woodside ("Henry"), born on January 28, 1993, has 
a chromosomal disorder, Klinefelter Syndrome, which 
causes speech and language delays, motor planning 
difficulties, hypotonia and overall delay in muscle 
development resulting in physical weakness. These 
disabilities make Henry eligible for educational and related 
services under the IDEA. Upon Henry's enrollment in 
kindergarten at a school in the School District of 
Philadelphia (the "School District"), W oodside and his wife 
(the "Woodsides") had a disagreement with the School 
District regarding the level of services prescribed for Henry 
under the IDEA. Specifically, the Woodsides objected to the 
frequency, duration, and delivery mode of Henry's physical 
and occupational therapy at school. As a result, the 
Woodsides requested an administrative due process hearing 
on Henry's behalf under the IDEA. Woodside r epresented 
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Henry throughout the hearing, which lasted seven sessions 
from September 11, 1999 to December 16, 1999. After the 
hearing, the School District was ordered to provide Henry 
with separate, hour-long occupational and physical therapy 
sessions each week--exactly the relief r equested by the 
Woodsides. Woodside then filed suit under the IDEA in 
district court, seeking attorney fees he claims to have 
earned representing Henry thr oughout the administrative 
proceedings and in connection with filing the district court 
suit. The district court entered summary judgment in favor 
of the School District on Woodside's claim for attorney fees, 
and Woodside appealed. 
 
III. 
 
"This Court exercises de novo review over a district 
court's grant of summary judgment. Summary judgment is 
appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. We view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered." Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 
474, 477 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 
IV. 
 
The IDEA provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding 
brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may 
award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the 
parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing 
party." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(B). The sole issue here is 
whether this provision authorizes an awar d of attorney fees 
to an attorney-parent who repr esented his child in 
administrative proceedings under the IDEA. Although this 
is an issue of first impression in this Cir cuit, a panel of the 
Fourth Circuit has answered the question in the negative in 
a case factually similar to this one. See Doe v. Board of 
Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1159 (1999). 
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In Doe, the court held that an attor ney-parent who won 
a favorable award for his child pursuant to administrative 
proceedings under the IDEA was not entitled to attorney 
fees for his work representing the child. In reaching its 
decision, the court noted "that fee-shifting statutes are 
meant to encourage the effective prosecution of meritorious 
claims, and that they seek to achieve this purpose by 
encouraging parties to obtain independent repr esentation." 
165 F.3d at 263. The court explained that"[l]ike attorneys 
appearing pro se, attorney-parents are generally incapable 
of exercising sufficient independent judgment on behalf of 
their children to ensure that `r eason, rather than emotion' 
will dictate the conduct of the litigation." Id. (citation 
omitted). The Doe court based its holding on the reasoning 
of a Supreme Court opinion in which a unanimous Court 
held that a pro se plaintiff who is an attorney cannot be 
awarded attorney fees under the fee-shifting provision of 
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awar ds Act, 42 U.S.C. 
S 1988(b), which contains language very similar to the IDEA 
fee-shifting provision.1See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 
(1991). In Kay, the Supreme Court, citing the adage that "a 
lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client," 
reasoned that "[t]he statutory policy of furthering the 
successful prosecution of meritorious [civil rights] claims is 
better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain 
[independent] counsel," rather than a rule that creates an 
incentive to represent one's self. See  499 U.S. at 438. 
 
The court in Doe acknowledged, as Woodside here argues, 
that a parent who represents his child under the IDEA does 
not act pro se. See 165 F.3d at 263-64. It recognized, 
however, that the danger of inadequate r epresentation is as 
great when an emotionally charged par ent represents his 
minor child as when the parent repr esents himself. See id. 
Because the policy behind the IDEA's fee-shifting pr ovision 
is to encourage the effective prosecution of meritorious 
claims, the Doe court concluded that the better rule is one 
which encourages parents to seek independent, emotionally 
detached counsel for their children's IDEA actions, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 1988(b) provides in part that"the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the 
costs." 
 
                                4 
  
thus held that attorney-parents cannot r ecover fees for 
representing their children in IDEA cases. Id. at 265. 
 
Because we agree with the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Kay and the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Doe, we join the 
Fourth Circuit in holding that an attor ney-parent cannot 
receive attorney fees for work repr esenting his minor child 
in proceedings under the IDEA. The district court's 
judgment is therefore 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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